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IntroductIon
The human ability to infer other people's mental states such as intentions, emotions, or desires, namely Theory of Mind (ToM; cf. Premack & Woodruff, 1978) , provides an essential basis for successful social interaction by enabling the prediction of other's most probable future acts (Frith & Frith, 1999) . The ability to appreciate the emotional states of a counterpart deepens social relationships. Therefore, the complex neuropsychological construct ToM is gathering vast interest in recent neuro scien tific research (e.g., Adolphs, 2003) . Successfully applying ToM in social interactions facilitates human relationships and attachment while impairment of ToM abilities have been described in various psychiatric diseases. Recently, ToM deficits have also been reported in neurological disorders and have been linked to the basal ganglia (BG;
see Alegre et al., 2010; Bodden, Dodel, & Kalbe, 2010) . In particular, ToM dysfunctions have been reported in patients suffering from neurodegenerative disorders such as Parkinson's disease (Bodden, Mollenhauer, et al., 2010; Péron et al., 2009 ) and Huntington's disease (Snowden et al., 2003) . Another functional system of social cognition that interacts closely with the ToM network is the human mirror neuron system. Alegre and colleagues (2010), who examined ToM abilities of patients suffering from Parkinson's disease in an EEG study, have proposed the involvement of the BG in this system as well.
A widespread network entailing the sulcus temporalis superior, the temporoparietal junction, the temporal poles, the ventromedial prefrontal, and the orbitofrontal cortex amongst other regions was suggested to form the neuroanatomical basis of ToM (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004) . To which extent the amygdala is contributing to the network during ToM processing is currently under discussion (Adolphs, 2010). The structures mentioned above are considered as the core regions involved in ToM abilities (Carrington & Bailey, 2009) . The finding that ToM dysfunctions are common in BG related neurological disorders leads to question a possible involvement of the BG in ToM. Altogether, the results of recent functional imaging studies examining the neural correlates of ToM are partly heterogeneous. To some extent this may be due to different ToM paradigm types such as cartoons (Gallagher et al., 2000) , written scenarios (Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999) , and other animated figures that have been used (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 2000) . Another source of heterogeneity of the results are the different concepts examined (ToM, empathy, etc.) as well as their operationalization. The ability to recognize or infer others' feelings or mental states (ToM) does not mandatorily entail empathy, defined as the ability to share others' feelings (Singer & Lamm, 2009) . Finally, conditions examining different subcomponents of the ToM concept were not always kept as comparable as possible.
The multifaceted construct ToM can be sub-divided into affective (i.e., recognizing the feelings of another person) and cognitive (i.e., inferring the mental states of the counterpart, his/her desires, beliefs, or intentions) subcomponents (Eslinger, 1998; Shamay-Tsoory, AharonPeretz, & Levkovitz, 2007) , each of which can be affected individually or in combination (Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010; Péron et al., 2009) . Various terms and definitions have been used in the literature to describe these subcomponents (Kalbe et al., 2007) , including emotional versus cognitive perspective taking (Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006) , empathy versus ToM (Völlm et al., 2006) The systematic investigation of affective and cognitive ToM has only recently been initiated and thus only a few functional imaging studies have compared both subcomponents. Different activation patterns referring to these subcomponents have been described (Hynes et al., 2006; Völlm et al., 2006) and it is suggested that the affective and cognitive ToM abilities recruit overlapping but partially distinct neural networks (Völlm et al., 2006 (Eslinger, 1998; Kalbe et al., 2010; Montag, Schubert, Heinz, & Gallinat, 2008) . In order to highlight this difference in the neural correlates of affective and cognitive ToM, both subcomponents should be investigated by using highly comparable stimulus material.
In the present study, we investigated whether the neural activation patterns of affective and cognitive ToM can be distinguished using a paradigm with highly comparable ToM conditions (adapted from German version by Kalbe et al., 2010) .
Furthermore, we examined the involvement of the BG in ToM and more precisely their contribution to affective and cognitive ToM.
Therefore, in addition, behavioural data of several ToM questionnaires were applied and the behavioural data of the Yoni task derived from the scanning session were related to a possible activation within the BG during the ToM task.
Methods

Subjects
Thirty-five right-handed (Edinburgh Handedness Inventory score > 80; cf. Oldfield, 1971) native German speaking participants were scanned. Of these 35 participants, five were excluded from the study due to reasons including technical problems during data acquisition (one participant), Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) scores of clinical relevance (> 14; two participants), or head movement during the scanning procedure (two participants). Of the remaining 30 participants (15 women, 15 men; M age = 25.3, SD age = 2.5 years, age range from 20 to 30; years of education: M = 13.9, SD = 2.2 years) none had a history of neurological or psychiatric disease and nobody used psychotropic drugs. This study was approved by the local ethics committee of the Philipps-University Marburg, and all participants gave written informed consent before enrolment.
Neuropsychological tests and questionnaires
For the assessment of verbal learning and memory, the Rey AuditoryVerbal Learning Test Trial (RAVLT; Schmidt, 1996) was conducted.
Working memory was evaluated using the digit span forward and backward from the revised version of the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-R; Härting et al., 2000) . In addition, the Corsi blockspan test (Härting et al., 2000) was administered. Executive functions were assessed applying 1-min lexical and semantic verbal fluency tasks with the letters F, A, and S, the category "groceries" (Aschenbrenner, Tucha, & Lange, 2000) , and the Trail Making Test (TMT; Tombaugh, 2004 
Statistical analysis
For each neuropsychological test, the mean score of the group was calculated and compared to norm data for the appropriate age. All neuropsychological test scores were correlated with the mentalizing scores (i.e., the IRI and E-Scale and the RMET as well as behavioural data of the Yoni task). Instead of Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, a more conservative alpha-level (p = .01) was chosen for this particular analysis.
fMRI stimulus material
For the present study, the Yoni task, a paradigm introduced by Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues, was adapted for the fMRI environment . In the stimulus material, the face of the main character named "Yoni" was located in the centre of the screen. 
fMRI procedure
An event-related design including the three conditions described above and a fixation cross in between the items serving as low level baseline was applied. Each of the 60 items was displayed for 6 s.
The fixation cross was jittered from 3.5 to 4.3 s (M = 3.9 s; cf. Figure 1). Presentation of stimuli was controlled using the Presenta- 
fMRI data acquisition and analysis
The study was conducted on a 1.5 T MRI (magnetic resonance imag- For second level analysis, the ß-contrasts of the affective, cognitive, and control condition obtained from the first level relative to the baseline were entered into a full factorial design. Initially, group activation maps related to each condition as well as the deactivation were calcu- 
results
Behavioural results
None of the participants showed cognitive deficits in the neuropsychological tests applied. The results are presented in Appendix A (Table A1) .
On average, participants solved 68.3%, SD = 9.6, of the RMET items correctly. In the Yoni task, participants solved 92.5%, SD = 8.0, of the items in the affective condition. In the cog condition, 90.3%, SD = 7.5, of the items were answered correctly (94.5%, SD = 8.2, in the phy condition; see Figure 2 ). Neither the comparison of the affective to the control condition (p = .443) nor of the cognitive to the control condition (p = .122) nor a comparison of affective and cognitive condition (p = .470) showed any significant difference on the behavioral level.
Results from the correlations between neuropsychological data and behavioural ToM data scores are displayed in Table A1 . 
Questionnaires
In the IRI, participants had an average value of 26.3, SD = 3.6, in the subscale perspective taking, 24.7, SD = 4.3, in fantasy, 25.3, SD = 3.9, in empathic concern, and 16.5, SD = 3.7, in personal distress.
In the subscales of the E-Scale, they scored on average 2.1, SD = 0.9, in cognitive sensitivity, 2.5, SD = 0.8, in emotional sensitivity, 1.9, SD = 0.8, in cognitive concern, and 2.4, SD = 0.7, in emotional concern.
There were no correlations between any neuropsychological data and results from the questionnaires. Neither were any correlations found between the behavioural data of the Yoni task and the scales from the questionnaires applied. Only age correlated with the subscale fantasy from the IRI (p = .004; cf. Table A1 ).
fMRI results
affective toM
Affective ToM contrasted to control (aff > phy) yielded significant activation of the right inferior temporal gyrus and the right superior were recruited as well. Sub cor ti cally, the caudate nucleus and the pallidum, both lateralized to the right hemisphere, were found activated (see Figure 3) . Finally, a cluster in the left cerebellum was activated (see Table A2 , clusters restricted to the visual cortex are not reported).
cognitive toM
The processing of the cognitive subcomponent of ToM contrasted to control (cog > phy) elicited activation in the right SMA (BA 6) and the right STS that extended into the amygdala, the right parietal lobule,
Figure 2.
Behavioural data of the yoni scales. Correlations between BG activation and questionnaires
As described above, activation was found in the BG when participants Keeffe et al., 2007) and with Huntington's disease (Snowden et al., 2003) . Additionally, involvement of the BG in the human mirror neuron system was recently discussed by Alegre and colleagues (2010) Another possible contribution of the BG to ToM is their involvement in cognitive flexibility (Niendam et al., 2012) . The ability to adopt the mental perspective of another person requires at least to a certain extent cognitive flexibility. However, this hypothesis could not explain a differentiation of activity between the affective and cognitive condition. Further research is needed to specify the differentiation as well as the relationships between both subcomponents. In order to look at circuitry involving the BG as part of the ToM network, functional imaging studies involving patients with BG disorders might be fruitful to elucidate the hypothesized distinction on a process level.
footnotes
1 The perfect balance of the possible gaze direction respectively its congruence with the correct answer was compromised when incorrectly answered items were excluded from the analysis. Thus, errors in the different conditions were counted, and no systematic errors were found. Regarding the cognitive items, we cannot find a difference. In the affective condition, there were more errors made when the face in the middle gazes straight forward. In our opinion, this finding does not influence the major results because the straight forward condition is not more difficult and does not produce more errors than the comparable cognitive condition, whereas the condition in which the gaze direction is congruent with the right answer is easy to solve.
Furthermore, it is impossible to discern between types of errors, for example, errors due to presses of the wrong button or due to choosing the wrong item. Unfortunately, this possible criticism of the study cannot be eliminated. Participants were trained in using the answer box within the scanner, but we think it was not possible to eliminate completely any misses (while pressing the buttons). Nevertheless, we think, this does not influence the major results, because we do not primarily analyse the behavioural data. We were focusing on the processes on a neural level.
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